Abstract
Goal of the paper
Industry and academic conferences alike have discussed India from the point of view of a wireless service and product market, and sometimes tried to assess quantitative attributes thereof. This is not the intent of the present paper which aims instead at looking from a management point of view at the unique underlying evolution processes, bottlenecks and risks.
For example, just to illustrate highlights of these unique attributes, it is indeed surprising that such a major economy with its very large population has not yet achieved the wireless service usage and mobile terminal penetration ratios of neither an early European adopter, nor of a recent large scale adopter like China or Russia. India has also been characterised by a surprising regulatory development process quite different from many other contexts, both in terms of its both centralised and regional structure, of absence of technology neutrality. At the same time, a very large fraction of the population has not for affordability and regional coverage reasons been able to get the access opportunities of more developed regions, leading to a distribution unbalance which is also a significant opportunity. Recently foreign and domestic investors have grown a proportionately large appetite for early phase wireless operators in India. Last but not least, the wireless service and product adoption pattern in India, specific to communication services, has so far been in rather sharp contrast with the widely known software and outsourcing services industry evolutions.
Therefore it is important to compare the most relevant known wireless service and product adoption theories, to establish from facts whether they apply in the Indian context, and, if not, suggest a new or mixed theory able to explain all such facts and cast some light into its likely future structural evolution. It is of high relevance in management to validate if indeed established models apply or not in a significant case like India, just as it is also of high relevance for the main stakeholders to identify methodology able to support their analyses.
The paper first provides a pointer at the background information on wireless, fixed, and other operators, on wireless penetration, on telecommunications infrastructure and investments, and on Indian human capital. Thereafter is analyzed in detail the relevance, or not, of five traditional technology adoption models across the Indian user base: the absorption business model, the perceived benefits business model, consumer attitudes, the globalisation business model, and finally the brand management business model. These first analyses are followed by the identification and detailed analysis of five other business models or structural processes, some rather unique to India: the two-tier migration model, large scale imported adoption without a telecommunications infrastructure & terminals industry, unstable adoption with lack of consistent public policies, knowledge sharing and productivity enhancement adoption model, and finally late foreign capital investments into a large emerging market.
From the comparison of facts and background data, with these ten wireless service and product adoption models, the paper establishes which are not relevant, and which are to some degree. Furthermore the relevant business models are shown to share, further attributes of sustainability (or not) and dynamic behaviour. The model comparison also allows diagnosing the key three structural measures needed to reach a sustainable equilibrium from the business, economic and social points of view.
Relevant traditional models
This Section reviews relevant business models from the literature in terms of their relevance for the Indian wireless service and product adoption. The hypotheses formulated are the result of the data collection and analysis work carried out in this research, and references have not been found others than those indicated in [1] .
Absorption business model
Conceptually, wireless successes hinge on how well users and businesses can absorb pertinent information and apply the knowledge they have gained towards meeting social needs, and developing products and services. The success of innovating products and services requires critical investments in the accumulation of knowledge.
A community's absorptive capacity, i.e. the ability to recognize and assimilate information and apply its cumulative knowledge towards a social or profit gain, defines this ability. The absorptive capacity is defined in [2] as a "set of organizational outlines and processes by which firms or individuals acquire, assimilate, transform and exploit knowledge to produce a dynamic organizational capability". As more knowledge is accumulated the organization's absorptive capacity grows as its ability to recognize and assimilate information expands.
To explain the growth of wireless services and products in India from this theory, one hypothesis is that India has had, thanks to education and social structure, a greater absorptive capacity than some other large emerging economies, and that, as a result, it will be more innovative, but will also more accurately meet and satisfy customer needs. However sofar the absorptive capacity has been very small for products, industrial development, and value added services and in the rural areas of the country, which to some extent invalidates this hypothesis. Also it is unclear if there has been any impact on the organizational absorptive capacity.
Perceived benefits business model
In this typical model used in the communications industry, perceived benefits refer to the anticipated advantages that an innovation can provide to a community or organization, and impact IT and communication services adoption. As communities are motivated by the perceived benefits from the adoption of an innovation, they realize the need to use the technology fully and integrate it with existing applications. To explain the growth of wireless services and products in India from this theory, one hypothesis would be that the public and business interests have identified the perceived benefits and taken the needed action. However, the late and slightly perturbed regulatory framework for wireless service deployment and investments, seem to invalidate this hypothesis in the early phases of wireless service deployment up to approximately 2003.
Consumer attitudes
In this theory linked to consumer behavior, its is the benefits as perceived by potential end users on the basis of their information, which drive the latent demand until other stakeholders create the knowledge, regulatory and investment frameworks to satisfy it. This is especially important for value added services; as shown in [3] from survey data (including for India) the consumer perceived usefulness, ease of use, behavioral control and reliability all positively influencee consumer's intentions to use SMS. To explain the growth of wireless services and products in India from this theory, one hypothesis is that the information access in India about end user benefits from wireless voice and SMS has been strong enough to fuel the implementation through India's democratic processes. But the same survey has also shown that subjective social norm does not influence the consumers' intention to use. Furthermore Indian industry does not yet have a tradition for responding to consumer demands for public services, transport and housing. This web of facts seems to invalidate this hypothesis in the Indian case.
Globalisation business model
India is one of the leading emerging markets in the world today. Developed economies view India as a major destination for expansion, offshore research and development. Thus the global and historic business model just reflects domestic as well as foreign will to extend the capabilities and reach of wireless services and products in India like everywhere else under competitive rules set by WTO. The end result should be the minimum average global connectivity of any economic actor and user in India.
The issue of finding the relationship between communications service adoption and economic growth has been studied by researchers in different environments. In [4, 5] is studied the relationship between telecommunications and the economic growth for developing nations; that study finds that traditional economic factors explain demand for main phone lines, not for the cellular phone services. The total impact of telecom penetration on the total output is also found to be significantly lower for developing countries than that reported for OECD countries. Table 1 illustrates the key differences in variables when comparing the Indian and Chinese telecommunications industry, and [6] reviews mobile terminal adoption. In the last five to six years, India's telecom growth rate has been more than that of China. This was largely possible due to policy changes, namely, introduction of new telecommunications policy, competitions, and growth in economy due to purchasing power increase. Total revenues of Indian service providers are low when compared to Chinese telecom players. Operational expenditures are higher for Indian operators when compared with their Chinese counterparts, and so is the marketing cost.
To explain the growth of wireless services and products in India from this theory, one hypothesis is that government and regulatory bodies have helped in improving the communications infrastructure everywhere and have offered incentives and/or transparent rules for competition to unfold. The National Telecommunications Policy, 1999 [6] was the first major initiative by the government in reviving the telecom industry in India. NTP '99 was targeted toward improving the nation's teledensity and network infrastructure. However, penetration is still far behind major developing economies in the world. In last 50 years, total teledensity growth rate is 1.92% [8], which is very low even it has soared from 0.5% in 1991 to 12.73% in 2006, but so has the 1,02 Billion population of the country [9] as has socio-economic development [10] . Gupta's work [11] however reveals that government efforts in resolving the regulatory and legal uncertainties are not always enabling the government to achieve public interest goals. All these studies for wireless as well as other communication services adoption seem to invalidate to a large extent the stated hypothesis.
Brand management business model
Brand management in India has been very strong in the mobile area. Operators built brand equity, and the choice of symbols and media whereby they have added or subtracted from customers' perceived value of the brand was done; but the choice of brands was rather narrow, and the effect has thus eased.
To explain the growth of wireless services and products in India from this theory, one hypothesis is that efficient brand and relatively easy brand management contributed significantly to this growth. Although studies on brand impact in India in the communications area are very few, they point at a high impact not matched however outside affluent layers in the society by any wireless service adoption. In other words, this hypothesis can maybe explain in parts the high adoption rate in the more affluent groups in the society, but is overridden for the rest of the population by affordability constraints.
Identified unique models or structural drivers
Amongst those unique service and product adoption structural drivers which have been identified, the following five seem to have the highest explanatory contribution to the justification of the past and current situation; they get compared in the following Section 4.
Two tier migration model, or the "urbanrural" difference in India
India can appear as a case in two-tier migration, not towards an under-developed deployment situation coexisting with a normal adoption (like in many countries), but towards a situation involving growth in both wireless services (mostly in coastal cities) and in converged fixed + fixed wireless services (mostly in the countryside).
Indian regulators and policy makers are planning to up the ante by implementing policies that will lead to an additional 150 M subscribers being installed by the end of 2007 on top of the 100 M from 2002; this will lead to an approximate fixed-line subscriber base of 50 M, with the remaining 200 M being earmarked for either fixed-wireless or mobile subscribers, seeking to increase teledensity to 22 percent with higher relative fixed line penetration. Such policies, and facts below, confirm that in India the migration to wireless services (cellular and fixed wireless) coexists with continued growth in the fixed segment, and in the future with fixed broadband. There is indeed strong growth in fixed subscriptions, with an aggregate increase of 117 % between 1995 and 2000. Most of the integrated players including Reliance, Bharti Televentures, Reliance Infocomm, BSNL are betting big on wireline phones and are rolling-out optical fiber cables with copper in the last mile across the country. Even MTNL, which operates in Delhi and Mumbai, is introducing new features, such as picture messaging and ringtones on its fixed-line terminals.
An unusually high percentage of the country's population, about 72 percent, resides in rural areas, compared to 58 percent in Indonesia and 60 percent in China. More importantly, India's rural GDP per capita is much lower at US$352 compared to US$765 in China. Since a significant portion of growth would likely have to come from the country's rural areas, for India to achieve its vision of 200 million wireless subscriptions, return on investment (ROI) becomes a major issue. Coverage expansion in rural areas, where the terrain is rough, has proven in many instances to be an expensive proposition. Moreover, the inability of the rural user to pay as much for services as the urban users' poses another equally serious problem. There are over 550,000 villages with less than 5,000 people residing in them. None of these have any mobile coverage as of today. Moreover, only 2,500 of India's roughly 5,200 towns are covered by mobile networks. With a teledensity goal of 22 percent, the issue is not only capacity related, but also a problem of coverage, requiring a great deal of investment from the operators. We still believe that the capital investment required to blanket a significant portion of the country (above 50%) is not within the means of any single operator. As such, a significant shift in policy, such as regulatory approval for network sharing in rural areas, is required to increase population coverage over such a short period of time.
Furthermore mobile, fixed or fixed wireless deployment in rural India has a user multiplier to it, in that each installed line can serve many more thanks to the "village operator" effect (so called Village Panchayat Telephones, or sometimes "walking mobile operators"). They often charge twice the operators' rates to people using their mobile terminals; out of the profit they repay loans and consume. The average village phone bill is about twice the average urban mobile ARPU. The western operators which have invested in local operators running such village services (such as Telenor's 51 % stake in Grameen Telecom in Bangladesh) have been quite satisfied.
Large scale imported adoption without a telecommunications infrastructure and terminals industry
India is a significant case, although far from unique (see e.g. Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria), of a large scale adoption without a native telecommunications infrastructure and terminals industry. Despite the user and usage growth, India today is a large net importer of almost all knowledge-intensive communications infrastructure and mobile terminals. Taking wireless networks alone (and except for physical buildings, cables and power), it is estimated that the operator usage revenues after government taxes cover a 92 % import quote for such systems. Royalty and license fees receipts in 2002 represented 1/10 th of China's, high tech exports represent only 5 % of manufactured exports (compared to China 23 %) while manufactured trade itself is only at 13 % of GDP (2002) and total expenditure for R&D was 0,78 % of GDP in 2001 ( factor almost three less than China) [12] . Furthermore, since 1993-94 till 2005-06, the average production of telephone instruments in India stands at 4.84 million [13] . This shows that there are not enough domestic equipment manufacturers to cater to the needs. In effect, India has lagged behind as a manufacturing center for communications systems and products (even falling behind other Asian countries), mainly because of infrastructure problems, and government regulations. And the few design or manufacturing centers are mostly foreign and rather small: Alcatel and partner ITI [14] , Texas Instruments, Sony Ericsson, Freescale Semiconductor India Pvt, MXC Mobile NXP, Itiam Systems Pvt, HCL Technologies, SemIndia. Similarly, due to a slow reform in the domestic Indian financial system, there are far less Indian VC firms (today only about 30), but far more mergers and acquisitions or floats on the capital markets and the Indian conglomerates invest mostly abroad [1] . There is an almost never mentioned area of difficulties for the telecommunications industry in India, in that often patents there are granted to scientists at a conceptual level, and they challenge specific design innovations by core suppliers. Under a British-type law and judicial system, and with bureaucratic hurdles, legal cases and disputes take far too long to resolve. The result is that essentially foreign players and domestic ones alike cannot rely on Indian IPR and that work for hire must be soleownership to the funding party.
Unstable adoption with lack of coherent public policies
Ironically, India's telecommunications industry often has been cited as an example of how deregulation can unshackle growth. It has been one of the biggest corporate-success stories since the government opened the sector to private investment in the 1990s, in part, because it was one of the first sectors in India opened to foreign ownership. The government in 2006 lifted the foreign-shareholding cap for telecommunications companies to 74% from 49%, although New Delhi has yet to clarify the circumstances under which the foreigners are allowed to invest. But a recurrence of familiar old problems, regulatory roadblocks and footdragging by state-owned competitors (called "babus"), is threatening at times to cool expansion in India's wireless sector and is frustrating telecommunications investors. Phone-company executives want Indian regulators to make it easier to expand and to pressure the national state-run phone service BSNL to take steps needed to give millions of new private-network subscribers' access to the state-owned network. Consumers in some cities complain that the quality of their service is deteriorating, with a rising number of dropped calls and lousy reception. Meanwhile, wireless operators aren't earning in as much revenue as they should because unplanned growth, connectivity problems are jamming up networks and making it tougher to sell value-added services such as those that let users download games. All private operators say they need state-owned BSNL to keep up if growth rates and service quality are to be maintained and improved.
In 2005, Indian mobile operators have fallen woefully short of targets explained above. They added a mere 4 M mobile subscribers during the first quarter, and an additional 3 M were added in the following two months. This takes the total wireless subscriber base in the country to 55 M, far away from where it should be if it were to add 152m before the end of 2007. If the regulatory regime is unable to immediately provide additional 2G spectrum to the country's operators and/or decides to levy a large license fee to award 3G spectrum, this will take the country's wireless subscriber base to approx. 102 M by end 2007, almost 50 percent less than the government's stated objective.
The final obstacle to achieving 200 M subscribers by end 2007 is the fact that Indian operators face some of the highest telecom levies in the world, particularly among mobile carriers within developing markets. Service and general sales taxes, license fees, spectrum charges and universal fund obligations can account for anywhere from 15-24 percent of an operator's gross revenue. On the other hand, operators in countries such as China, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, are usually charged between 2-4 percent of their revenues in regulatory taxes and levies. Moreover, the 15-24 percent paid by Indian operators is on top of the Access Deficit Charge (ADC), a fee of between 5-25 percent added on to per-minute tariffs to finance the development of fixed-line networks in the country.
Knowledge sharing and productivity enhancement adoption model without manufacturing contributions
In Section 3.2 was already established that the communications service and product creation and manufacturing are playing only a very modest role towards the adoption of wireless services and products in India. The question however remains in terms of development model if this adoption was and is fueled by knowledge sharing and productivity enhancement alone.
In World Bank's Knowledge economy index ranking, India still ranks very low (about value 3 on scale of 10). Nevertheless, especially international organizations using the World Bank, "Knowledge Assessment Methodology" [12] have repeatedly pointed out at the Indian knowledge based economy's strength. In so doing, however, the concept is used more broadly to cover how any economy harnesses and uses new and existing knowledge to improve the productivity of agriculture, industry, and services and increase overall welfare. There is a major difference between the types of network supported information content in rural and urban areas. In rural areas the need for communications is mostly related to emergency and social reasons, such as getting in touch with relatives at home and abroad or calling medical assistance. Economic activities rely still on personal contacts; however as mobile communications are well suited for this purpose, they have a large latent following for this use in Indian rural areas. In the urban areas, the knowledge economy is driven by businesses of all sizes and in all sectors, which all use wireless and satellite communications extensively largely to reduce transaction costs and lowering the barriers of time and space.
Fierce price competition has resulted in Indian mobile telephony rates becoming one of the cheapest in the world. India's charges per minute are said to be the lowest in the world, as service providers offer deals that include a lifetime of unlimited incoming calls for a one-time fee of 1,000 rupees ($21.75). "Everybody can afford it," said T. V. Ramachandran, director general of the Cellular Operators Association "the teawallah, the dhobi and the sabsiwallah," conjuring up the traditional tea vendor, launderer and vegetable seller. Bharti Airtel's charges average national average of 3 US cents /min. Subscribers are responding to offerings like the Don't Stop Mobile plan of Tata Teleservices, which includes a handset and unlimited talk time for two years for just over $30. This has been a boon, mostly in urban areas but especially to people in India's rural villages, which have had no access to communication through traditional means, such as fixed lines. It can be concluded that the knowledge sharing and productivity enhancement model is starting to impact selectively Indian adoption of wireless services and products as both an enabler and a result of needs. However this effect will for quite some time be dampened because of the unfavorable urbanrural population ratio combined with a highly skewed income distribution in favor of the rich. Since a significant portion of growth would likely have to come from the country's rural areas, and since average revenue per subscriber is already one of the world's lowest, for India to achieve its vision of 200 million wireless subscriptions, return on investment (ROI) for operators becomes a major issue. Optimists say India can leapfrog slower-bandwidth tech with a speedy launch of 3G; but 3G as a revenue booster in India is far-fetched at this time. On the upside, freeing up the 3G band may alleviate a spectrum shortage, but it may hurt low end users. [13] . One established business model for large emerging markets is the one where foreign capital investments (FCI), when accepted, has fueled the adoption of communication services by taking either a longer term pay-back view or the view to establish a strong foothold early enough at lower costs. The paradox with India has been that FCI in the communications sector with significant or majority stakes, has only be authorized so late that it could not boost the adoption of services and infrastructure deployment, and furthermore that it had to cope with low ROI. Up until 2005 the direct foreign shareholding ceiling was 49 %, now raised to 74 %. Only in Internet services was 100 % FCI authorized since 1999 [7] . As a matter of fact, some foreign early small stake investors had to leave due to too low ROI and bureaucratic hurdles. In 2003, Vodafone exited the Indian market and its 21 % share in RPG Cellular, to re-enter late in 2005 with a 10 % stake in Bharti Tele Ventures (about 1.5 BUSD), making it the largest foreign investment in India, valuing customers at 990 USD/subscriber, and then acquiring a large stake in Hutchinson Essar in 2007. But for all the price it paid for these stakes Vodafone was only the second foreign investor in Bharti , next to Singapore Telecom, which has thrice the stake with 30,7 %. Recent financial battles involving investors Vodafone, Hutchison, Tata , Singapore Telecom, Mittal, Wal Mart and targets Bharti, Essar are driven by a mix of unloading profitable assets (e.g. high relative profitability of Essar) at the peak of financial markets, of tapping urban customers from 3 G revenue, and gambling on major regulatory changes; all are likely to be overpaid deals again vs. actual ARPU.
Late foreign capital investment into a large emerging market

Comparison of alternative relevant business models
This paper has so far reviewed ten business models or structural drivers for the adoption of wireless services and products in India. The assessments can summarized as follows; all five adoption models from Section 2 are largely invalid or only valid for the affluent groups in society; the processes of Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 and 3.5 are valid but not sustainable; the process of Section 3.4 is slowly emerging but risky.
In view of this summary it appears that most traditional and stable adoption models from Section 2 fail to explain in a cohesive way the observed evolution in India across wireless user groups. On the contrary, most of the unique models or other structural processes identified in the subsequent Section 3 seem to give a better explanation of this evolution across wireless user groups. However most of these unique processes carry with them structural instabilities: imbalance across social groups, inconsistent public policies, weaknesses in the economic sectoral structure, and sectoral balance of payment problems.
Some readers of this research have argued that questionnaire surveys should have been used to validate the results; the authors contend that it would be almost impossible to find a knowledgeable panel with field experience, so cross-validation from diverse sources and own field work has been preferred.
Conclusion
The combined result is an overall quite fragile adoption and deployment path with growing tensions such as coverage, quality of service and affordability disparities. Besides their usual instability, the unique structural processes share the characteristic of high dynamic fluctuation dependency which warrant some quantitative modelling via system dynamics; however the underlying phenomena are so fundamental or sporadic in time that the approximation quality would be doubtful. The specific or unique characteristics prove that the adoption may only get sustainable if three conditions are jointly met: i. Stable transparent technology neutral regulations offering domestic and foreign investments alike a reasonable return even in a non growth scenario ii. The exploitation of the potential of the rural areas with lower cost infrastructure and tariffing packages, with backbone infrastructure sharing and possibly some build-operate-lease back arrangements for faster deployment iii. A reorientation of Indian industry towards tapping the growth opportunities, once sustainable equilibrium margins can be reached, including turning into export opportunities instead of just being a large net importer
The lesson applies to the adoption of high technology services and products in India as elsewhere, that is that structural fragility and unexploited opportunities deviating too much from a stable absorption process may jeopardize the perceived societal and business advantages. These conclusions match well with the observation [16] that the Indian growth in total factor productivity in services in India may be overstated, that inflation in services may be underestimated causing real growth to be overestimated, and that the manufacturing weakness is an impediment.
